List articles
| The purpose of this article is to reveal the author’s definition of competitive organizational competencies and to offer a tool for its practical perception – a matrix of perception of competitive competencies. For this, the article reveals the terminological difference between competence and competence and confirms the existence of such a difference in relation to not only the individual, but also the university. With regard to the organization, it is also possible to distinguish the knowledge-resource-expert aspect of the organization’s activities and the functional-active aspect. The organization develops collective, distributed, internal abilities (organizational competence) to perform actions that constitute a specific, specific direction of activity (organizational competence). The work describes a matrix of perception of competitive competencies, specially developed by the author, and proposes to use it as an analytical tool for university leaders. The properties of competence, which, on the one hand, reflect its activity content (i.e., the connection with a specific professional activity), and, on the other hand, have a competitive value and make sense in the context of competitive confrontation, are of priority importance. The matrix reflects the degree of proximity of the competence to the core of the business and the degree of uniqueness and specificity of the competence. The matrix of perception of competitive competencies proposed by the author makes it possible to clearly clarify the key, competitive, sectoral, auxiliary (additional), unique competencies of the university. When defining competitive organizational competence, the author discloses two methodological ways to combine competitive and competence-based approaches: to understand competence as a means or as a goal of competition. The author defines competitive organizational competence as a unique organizational ability that cannot be copied by competitors, which allows it to withstand competition at a high level of competitiveness. In this understanding, competitive competencies are not the goal of competition, but a means of competition, an instrument of competition. Continue... | |
| The article, based on the results of a study of current Russian economic, corporate management and judicial law enforcement practice, highlights various configurations of investment alliances regulated by the terms of corporate agreements that are in demand in large and moderately large businesses. The author draws the reader’s attention to the reference targets implemented in the operation of the corresponding models of such agreements of investors in the shares of joint-stock companies and shares in the authorized capital of limited liability companies, as well as on the management and legal tools for achieving these goals. The problem of modeling investment alliances in relation to the solution of long-, medium- and short-term goals and objectives of subjects of entrepreneurial practice requires the use of interdisciplinary analysis – research at the intersection of economics, management, management and law. The purpose of the article is to formulate the problem of modeling investment alliances, describe traditional models of investment alliances and reveal the institutions of modeling investment alliances that contribute to solving this problem. Among others, the authors analyze structures that effectively support the joint business practice of majority and minority shareholders, significant minority shareholders who consolidate corporate control with their help, activate the possibilities of corporate agreements concluded under Russian law for the implementation of mergers and acquisitions projects, as well as anti-raider protection of the target company. The author characterizes the traditional models of investment alliances: “Oath of Allegiance”, “Parity Formula”, “Presale Preparation”, “Speculative Agreement”, “Alliance of Minority Shareholders”, “Anti-Raider Coalition”. The author reveals the institutions of modeling an investment alliance: special rights of a participant, disproportionate powers, special rules of non-public companies, disproportionate contributions, and a corporate agreement. The author also emphasizes the diversity of the roles of participants in investment alliances, taken into account when solving the problem of modeling investment alliances. Continue... | |
|
№ 3(83)
10 august 2021 year
Rubric: Antitrust regulation Authors: Shastitko A., Ionkina K., Pavlova N. |
Recently, discussions about the validity of the Russian practice of establishing the facts of individual abuse of collective dominance have been escalating: many experts point to a contradiction between the meaning of collective dominance, in which a small number of companies have a joint dominant position, in connection with each other, and the possibility of an individual company to abuse this position. The purpose of the article is to assess the correctness of this approach in the context of recent antitrust cases in the cellular communications market – in particular, two cases against the mobile operator “Tele2”. In the article, the applied practice is assessed in relation to the currently known results in the field of economic theory, as well as international best practices in the application of the concept of collective dominance. The findings indicate that the conclusion of the FAS Russia on the presence of the dominant position of Tele2 as part of collective dominance and the possibility of the company to exercise its market power does not correspond to either foreign practice or industrial organization theory. The source of error in the qualification of behavior is largely due to the focus of the antimonopoly authority on quantitative criteria of collective dominance to the detriment of the analysis of qualitative criteria and behavior. This case illustrates a typical tendency for such cases not to investigate the behavior of other collectively dominant market participants in relation to the behavior of the company accused of individual abuse, as well as not to investigate consumer behavior, and, in particular, their real possibilities to switch and switching actions. The article was written on the basis of the RANEPA state assignment research programme. Continue... |
|
№ 3(83)
10 august 2021 year
Rubric: Antitrust regulation Authors: Knyazeva I., Bondarenko I., Zaikin N. |
Antitrust law includes a number of evaluation norms in system of commodity market analysis and proofs of anti-competitive behavior, which provide for using wide range of economics and marketing methods. The widest field of discussing embedded in definition “price discrimination”. Specific research interest presents the making recommendations of regulation of shortage markets with unfounded differences in prices. This question we propose to consider in two articles: in first article we make theoretical analysis of price discrimination in situation of shortage markets, in second article (will be published in no. 4) we analyze marketing aspects and system of sales stimulation, which the seller accomplish on the shortage markets. In the focus of this research is price discrimination as a market mechanism and shortage markets as a market anomaly. The shortage markets in contrast of shortage on the market occurs not for reason that price is below the equilibrium level. The main reason of genesis of shortage markets is speculative demand on the markets and/or difficulties in producing goods and services. These difficulties often set by outside shocks. Price discrimination undergoing of effect of long-run shortage on markets transforming in phenomenon, which damages of consumer wealth and entrepreneurs benefits. In addition, this type of price discrimination decrease the social welfare too. The risks of price discrimination in the case of shortage markets needed new decisions and methods of regulation by state. However now we do not see some consensus in the issue of principles and instruments of state regulation of shortage markets. In the article we try to approbate some scientific results. These results are the hybrid definition of price discrimination; the legislative definitions of price discrimination as a acts which limiting competition; the criteria of functioning of shortage markets; proofs of transforming markets through the impact of long-run shortage; the difference between the case of shortage markets and the case of shortage on the markets in the classical demand-supply model; costs of price discrimination on the shortage markets; perspective antitrust regulation of price discrimination on the shortage markets. Continue... |
| The article distinguishes between the immediate and final results of the competition policy. The importance of taking into account the final results for the state and society is justified. It is argued that they can be quantified by calculating consumer benefits from eliminating and preventing violations of antitrust laws. The calculation method used in The Competition and Market Authority (CMA, UK) is given. In addition to calculating direct gains (losses), it also calculates indirect ones arising from the reaction of firms-outsiders to the investigation. The criteria for the effectiveness of competition policy in the UK and in Russia are described, and their comparison is carried out. The article reproduces the foreign experience of calculating consumer surplus on the example of the FAS’ investigation of the cartel. The resulting surplus is compared with the average consumer surplus calculated based on the amount of fines collected and the number of cases initiated. The structure of the FAS law enforcement in the context of saved surpluses is recognized as suboptimal. Next, a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of competition policy measures is carried out using the “difference-in-differences” method: the contribution of the FAS to the change in the prices of firms-violators is investigated. Based on the obtained estimates and data on the volume of sales of goods, consumer surpluses are calculated from the investigation of two types of violations – the conclusion of anticompetitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position, as well as from the prevention of violations by issuing warnings. Extrapolation of the surpluses to the entire set of cases for the year, and comparison of the total surpluses for the year with the FAS budget showed that the level of effectiveness of the competition policy in Russia is not inferior to the one in the UK. Continue... | |
| This article aims to characterize the new theoretical and methodological reversal observed today in the American antitrust regulation of digital platforms. To this end, the author retrospectively describes the history of the development of the theory and methodology of antitrust regulation in the United States. The article describes the ideas of economic structuralism of the “Harvard school”. Further, the author reveals the theoretical and methodological revolution associated with the theory of prices; describes the fundamental differences between the “Harvard” and “Chicago” schools in terms of assessing the relationship between market structure and the intensity of competition. The article reveals the formation of the doctrine of consumer welfare as the dominant one in antitrust regulation. The consequences of the application of the doctrine of consumer welfare in antitrust regulation are described: the narrowness of ideas about barriers to entry, public welfare; breadth of understanding of competitive forces; ignoring the structural and sectoral characteristics of competition; absolutization of indicators of consumer prices and output volumes. The author gives a negative assessment of the effectiveness of the application of the doctrine of consumer welfare in the antitrust regulation of digital platforms. The paper explains how the focus on consumer welfare has been used by digital platforms to generate gigantic market power. In this context, a criticism of the ideas of the Chicago School in relation to digital markets is presented. Reanimation of ideas and methods of economic structuralism in decision-making within the framework of antimonopoly regulation of monopolistic activities of digital platforms is argued. Continue... |
