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Authors

Khvalynskiy D.

Degree
PhD of Economics, doctoral candidate of Altai State University
E-mail
hdms@email.ru
Location
Barnaul
Articles

About some risks of the state in the spending taxpayer`s money: analysis of primary method of public procurement in Russia

The aim of this work is the analysis of foreign practice of auctions concerning the stability of the expected revenue. In 1961 W. Vickrey noted that in conditions of risk aversion of the participants Dutch auction is more profitable than English one. In 1984 Maskin and Riley complement that the same result should take place if the auctioneer is risk-averse, and the participants are risk-neutral. Complementing the above works, the author shows the advantage of the first-price auctions in the presence of high risk participants and makes the conclusion, that the same form of auctions should choose risk-neutral organizer of public procurement system, as the participants of the pro- curement system is not neutral to risk. Despite the findings, the author notes consistent implementation of English reverse auctions in the Russian system of public procurement, beginning with 2006. The author shows that, despite the large «random» high efficient e-auctions, the overall efficiency of English reverse auctions in Rus- sia is significantly lower than the less risky auction forms and even lower then «beauty contest», the main competition in which occurs with non-price criteria. The author reveals the negative externali- ties of English reverse auctions in Russia to the market conditions and offers to provide immediate transition of the Russian public procurement to less risky auction forms.
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Оптимизация классических моделей аукциона в целях увеличения дохода аукциониста

В работе описаны условия повышения доходности четырех стандартных для мировой практики моделей аукциона — английского аукциона, аукциона второй цены (аукциона Викри), аукциона закрытых ставок и голландского аукциона. Кроме того, исследован ряд специальных моделей многообъектных аукционов, разработанных зарубежными исследователями для случаев одновременной продажи нескольких объектов: аукцион универсальной цены, аукцион «Заплати свою ставку», многообъектный аукцион Викри, иерархический аукцион пакетных ставок, механизм Викри–Кларка–Гровса, одновременные возрастающие аукционы, аукцион Аузубеля, прокси-аукцион Аузубеля, Крэмтона и Милгрома и аукцион смешанных товаров Клемперера. По результатам анализа преимуществ и недостатков существующих моделей стандартных и многообъектных аукционов автором разработана и предложена новая модель аукциона, который представляет собой симбиоз английского аукциона, аукциона закрытых ставок и аукциона Викри, предполагает заключение контрактов на основе ставок конкурентов и обеспечивает более высокий ожидаемый доход аукционисту. Рассмотрены преимущества в доходности предложенной модели аукциона по сравнению со стандартными моделями аукционов. Разработанная автором модель аукциона может найти успешное применение при формировании заказчика- ми правил конкурентных закупок в рамках реализации Федерального закона от 18 июля 2011 г. № 223‑ФЗ «О закупках товаров, работ, услуг отдельными видами юридических лиц», а также при доработке законодателем правил конкурентных закупок, предусмотренных Федеральным законом от 5 апреля 2013 г. № 44‑ФЗ «О контрактной системе в сфере закупок товаров, работ, услуг для обеспечения государственных и муниципальных нужд».
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Improving the performance of first-price auctions in Russian public procurement

Federal law No. 44‑FZ of 5 April 2013 «On the contract system in procurement of goods, works, services for state and municipal needs» provided for use by customers two standard auctions — first-price sealed-bid auction (presented in the form of request of quotations, open contest & request of proposals), as well as an English auction (presented in the form of electronic auction). The former Federal law of 21.07.2005 № 94‑FZ «About placing of orders for deliveries of goods, performance of works, rendering of services for state and municipal needs» was allocated a similar standard auctions. The request for quotations is one of the most popular ways of purchasing goods for state and municipal needs in Russia. In 2014 the state customers conducted more than 306 thousand requests for quotation that exceeded 20.7 percent of all competitive procurement procedures. Statistics on public procurement of Russia for the last 4 years showed that the first-price sealedbid auction in almost all cases is more profitable than the English auction. However, the request for quotations retains one very significant disadvantage associated with the inability of the revaluation of the contract during the procurement procedures. In the paper, the author proposes the model of a hybrid auction that combines two first-price sealed-bid. The auction rules are closer to the rules of the English auction, however the secrecy of winning bid in each round of the auction promotes competition. The auction winner is the participant who has offered the lowest price for executing the contract in the final stage, as well as in the first or second stage. Thus, for victory in the auction the participant will need to win at least two stages, that will ensure the interest of the participants in revealing of real values, and thus will not reduce the number of participants. A new method for determining the winner in the auction allows to abandon discrimination in access to the next stages of the hybrid auction.
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